By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy.
Middle East@War - following on from our highly successful Africa@War series, Middle East@War replicates the same format - concise, incisive text, rare images and high quality color artwork providing fresh accounts of both well-known and more esoteric aspects of conflict in this part of the world since 1945..
The text is supported by numerous photographs and color profiles.
The large variety of aircraft flown - Dassault Mysteres, Dassault Ouragans and Gloster Meteors
B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs and De Havilland Mosquitoes
T-6 Texans (Harvards) and T-17 Kaydets (Stearmans)
Nord 2501 Noratlases, C-47 Skytrains (Dakotas), Pipers and Consuls and even a pair of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters - are all covered in this title, which presents Israeli Air Force Operations during the Suez War in a depth and detail unseen in previous publications.
Operation KADESH was the Israeli part in the Anglo-French attack and this title chronicles Israeli Air Force Operations along the timeline of Operation KADESH - from day 1 on 29 October 1956 until day 11 on 8 November 1956 - in thus far unmatched depth and detail; all known Israel Air Force missions and sorties are listed and described and all air combats between Israeli Mysteres and Egyptian Mi Gs and Vampires are presented and analyzed.
By participating in 1956 Suez Crisis Israel exploited an opportunity to join forces with France and the United Kingdom in an attack against Egypt in order to accomplish diplomatic, military and political objectives: to open the Red Sea international shipping lane to ships sailing from and to Eilat; to strengthen its alliance with France; to end - or at least to scale down - Egyptian hosted Palestinian terror attacks against Israel; to launch a preventive war in order to crush Egyptian military power before its completion of the transition to Soviet weapons could tempt Egypt to attack Israel and in order to accomplish a profound victory to deter Egypt from pursuing a another round of war policy
